Patent Thickets in Technology Industries: Hidden Barriers To Market Entry and Innovation

Rachita Nangalia (NIDAN IPR Research Series 2026)

Introduction

Innovators face a world in which most products incorporate multiple prior inventions, each subject to claims of value owned by different rights holders. Where once commentators may have feared market failure caused by a single Blocking Patent, complex products today may encounter Blocking Portfolios consisting of many partially-overlapping claims at the firm, jurisdictional and technological level. Popularly this collection of rights has been termed a patent thicket. Carl Shapiro popularized the term ‘dense web of overlapping intellectual property rights’ through which companies must hack their way to commercialize new technology.[1]

Today’s economy relies on successive waves of innovation: each generation of device, platform, protocol or software invariably stands on ‘shoulders of giants’. In this context, if patents can ever become dense enough around particular technologies to constitute a ‘thicket’, concerns arise that innovation may be stifled as would-be innovators face difficulty in negotiating the risks of infringement. The concern applies most strongly in technology-intensive sectors. Modern smartphones and tablets, software architectures, telecommunications equipment and semiconductor manufacturing all tend to involve the integration of hundreds, if not thousands of patented inventions[2].

For large incumbents with extensive patent portfolios, this landscape can be navigated as a defensive, strategic, or revenue-maximising asset. For potential market entrants, the existence of thickets can generate significant uncertainty as to freedom-to-operate. The resulting transaction costs have implications beyond legal budgets. They affect access to financing, bargaining position and co-operating with competitors, product design, speed to market and, ultimately, a smaller firm’s ability to compete with larger established players[3].

Accordingly, this Paper focuses on patent thickets as overlapping pools of patents, particularly in technology-intensive industries. It explores the use of large patent portfolios to erect barriers to entry and affect competition between firms. It also considers related transaction costs and royalty issues such as patent hold-up and royalty stacking[4]. Where relevant, it discusses how these relate to competition law and recent regulatory developments. It further considers increased transaction costs, licensing complexities, patent hold-up, royalty stacking, and the broader tension between innovation incentives and anti-competitive effects, while incorporating discussion of competition law and regulatory responses supported by case-based analysis[5]. The principal analytical focus is India, but comparative references to the United States and Europe are included to situate the Indian approach in the wider debate.

Concept and Economic Logic of Patent Thickets

A patent thicket arises when numerous overlapping patents, frequently held by various companies, encompass complementary or closely connected technological aspects essential for commercialization[6]. While in simpler industries, a single patent might correspond relatively distinctly to one invention, in intricate technologies, products rely on a multitude of patentable elements, increasing the likelihood of overlapping rights. Consequently, patent thickets are particularly linked to cumulative and modular innovation settings.

The economic challenge posed by thickets isn't just the sheer volume of patents; it's the dispersed control over vital technological components. When a company has to negotiate with many patent owners, pinpoint relevant claims, judge validity, and foresee infringement risks before entering a market, transaction costs increase significantly[7]. The research of Noel and Schankerman, referenced in subsequent studies, links fragmented rights to declines in firm market value, while Cockburn and MacGarvie demonstrate that denser thickets can postpone venture capital funding for software start-ups[8].

Patent thickets also reshape the strategic landscape. Established companies might amass patents not only to safeguard inventions but also to strengthen their negotiating positions in cross-licensing discussions, discourage lawsuits from competitors, or discourage market entry for smaller companies that cannot build similar patent collections[9]. This strategic patenting dynamic was documented in semiconductor and software-related literature, where firms responded to fragmented ownership by patenting more aggressively[10]. The result can be self-reinforcing: the denser the thicket, the stronger the incentive to add yet more patents as defensive weapons.

Thickets aren't always seen as bad news in the research. Sometimes, a lot of patents in one area can mean there's a great chance for new tech and lots of new ideas popping up. Hall, Helmers, and von Graevenitz pointed out that when there's a good opportunity and things are complex, new players might jump in, even though there's a risk of getting blocked[11]. So, the trick for the law isn't to just say that having lots of patents is a problem, but to tell the difference between companies protecting their inventions fairly and those using patent portfolios to unfairly block others, making it too expensive for them to get started, beyond what's needed to reward innovation[12].

Market Entry, Financing and Innovation Effects

One significant consequence of a patent thicket is its impact on entering a market. Research indicates that these thickets increase the costs of entry and decrease the likelihood of companies, especially newcomers, securing patents or venturing into innovative technological fields. This holds true even when considering the existing opportunities and complexities within the technology[13]. Hall, Helmers, and von Graevenitz have concluded that the risk of being held up by patents within these thickets discourages companies from entering certain technology areas[14]. This effect is seen in both large corporations and small businesses. Essentially, if a company needs to navigate a complicated patent landscape to access a market, they might simply decide not to participate.

This effect is especially challenging for startups. Cockburn and MacGarvie have found that software startups in markets with denser patent thickets face delays in receiving initial venture capital[15]. Investors are less interested in opportunities where future profits are uncertain. This is because the startup might have to design their products to avoid existing patents, pay for licenses, or deal with potential lawsuits and injunctions. Therefore, patent thickets can be invisible obstacles to market entry, influencing the willingness of investors to fund innovation long before a product is available to consumers[16].

Another consequence affects the quality and direction of innovation. Difficult patent environments might cause companies to focus on defensive patenting, building up their patent portfolios, and managing legal risks, rather than concentrating on research that could lead to groundbreaking products[17]. Resources are then shifted towards searching for existing patents, expanding patent portfolios, applying for patents, and preparing for potential lawsuits. Smaller innovators might completely avoid certain valuable fields, which could discourage the overall progress of innovation, even if the legal system technically allows them to enter[18].

A final consequence involves the structure of the industry. Established companies with a wide variety of patents can use them to gain an advantage in negotiations, control standards, or negotiate cross-licensing agreements on terms that are not available to new companies[19]. When established companies have dense patent portfolios covering related technologies, new companies face not only a single patent holder but an entire network of mutually supporting barriers. This is why patent thickets are often seen as obstacles to entering the market, rather than simply examples of strong patent protection.

Licensing Complexities, Hold-Up and Royalty Stacking

The complexity of licensing is really at the heart of the patent thicket issue. In theory, patents should help the market for technology by making it possible to license, pool, or transfer rights. But, in reality, when you need multiple licenses from different owners, it can get really expensive to figure out which patents matter, decide what’s essential, negotiate royalty rates, and sort out overlapping claims[20]. This is especially true in industries that rely on standards, like telecommunications, where you need access to a bunch of patented technologies to make things work together[21].

Patent hold-up happens when a company has already invested a lot in a technology or standard, and then a patent owner takes advantage of that situation to ask for higher royalties or stricter terms than they could have gotten beforehand[22]. The research on thickets connects the potential for hold-up with higher legal costs and less motivation for new companies to enter the market[23]. Once technologies and investments are locked in, the company using them loses bargaining power, and this imbalance can discourage participation from the start.

Royalty stacking is a similar problem. When many rights holders each want a royalty on the final product, the total royalty burden can become too much, even if each individual request seems reasonable[24]. In complex products like smartphones, network equipment, or semiconductor devices, stacking can significantly increase production costs and make it harder for smaller companies to get started[25]. This risk also benefits established companies with broad patent portfolios because they can balance royalties internally or through cross-licensing, which isn't an option for entrants with limited resources.

Patent pools are often suggested as a way to help solve these issues. A well-organized pool can lower transaction costs by creating a single place to get licenses for overlapping rights, especially when patents complement each other and are truly essential[26]. However, pools need to be carefully designed: if they combine competing patents, exclude those on the outside, or hide collusive coordination, they can create competition problems themselves[27]. So, the challenge for policymakers is not just whether to encourage pooling, but how to make sure that licensing structures reduce the costs of thickets without hurting competition.

Sectoral Manifestations in Technology Industries

Telecommunications offers a prime contemporary example of a patent thicket. Mobile communication standards, wireless protocols, and ecosystems for connected devices rely on a multitude of patents, some essential to the standard and others critical for implementation, spread across major companies[28]. Entering these sectors often demands well-thought-out licensing approaches. Disputes over fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory (FRAND) obligations, injunctions, and the total cost of royalties highlight the inherent thicket issue[29]. While standards can grow markets by ensuring things work together, they also establish central points of control where patent collections become strategic assets.

The software industry presents a different yet related scenario. Software is built in pieces, improved over time, and builds upon itself. In the U.S., the swift increase in software patents has led to a situation where even fairly basic software may involve thousands of patent claims[30]. Cockburn and MacGarvie explain how the expenses of sorting out patent rights, uncertainty about the extent of claims, and the risk of lawsuits can impact both getting into and funding software markets[31]. The software case is relevant to India because its innovation-driven economy is increasingly reliant on services enabled by software, digital platforms, AI tools, and communications infrastructure, even though Indian patent law has historically been more cautious about computer-related inventions.

Semiconductors and electronics also illustrate the race to amass patent portfolios that comes with thickets. Research on semiconductors reveals that fragmented ownership of related rights has encouraged companies to strategically seek patents to strengthen their negotiating power[32]. This doesn't automatically mean less innovation across the board, but it does demonstrate how companies respond to thickets by growing their patent collections instead of relying solely on competition in the product market. In highly interconnected industries, intellectual property serves as both a defense and a tool for negotiation.

Pharmaceuticals are sometimes considered separately because product protection often hinges on a smaller set of key patents. However, the underlying logic of thickets can still surface through secondary patents, process patents, formulation claims, and strategies for managing a product's lifecycle. India’s response to concerns about evergreening, particularly through section 3(d) of its patent law, is pertinent here. It demonstrates how patentability standards can be employed to prevent unnecessary layers of patents around existing substances[33]. Although pharmaceutical thickets are structured differently than those in telecommunications or software, the core policy question remains: does cumulative patenting encourage and reward invention, or does it create artificial obstacles to subsequent competition?

The Indian Legal Framework

To understand India's stance, we need to consider how patent law, competition law, and the interpretation of public interest all intersect. The Patents Act of 1970 grants patents to spur innovation, but it also sets patentability standards and limitations that show the legislature's dedication to balancing individual rights with things like access, competition, and technological progress[34]. Key aspects for dealing with technology-sector thickets include India's focus on ensuring patent quality, restrictions on what can be patented, and remedies like compulsory licensing when necessary.

Section 3(d) is often talked about in relation to pharmaceuticals, but it's also important because it pushes back against simply adding more patents without actually improving the effectiveness of existing substances[35]. The Supreme Court's ruling in Novartis AG v Union of India is generally understood to mean that Indian patent law isn't meant to reward minor changes that don't meet the law's high standards[36]. While section 3(d) doesn't directly address telecommunications or software thickets, it suggests that India prefers to filter out weak or strategically layered patents rather than allowing them to pile up.

India's approach to computer-related inventions is also worth noting. While Indian law doesn't completely ban all software-related patents, section 3(k) and the Patent Office's practices aim to prevent overly broad monopoly protection for abstract software claims just because they're presented as technical implementations[37]. This is important because one of the reasons for thickets in other countries has been the granting of broad or vague claims in software-heavy areas. By being stricter about claim scope and technical contributions, India can proactively reduce the density of these thickets.

Compulsory licensing under the Patents Act provides an additional safeguard[38]. Although it's not used often, it shows that exclusive rights can sometimes hinder public access or fail to meet the public's needs. While compulsory licensing isn't a perfect solution for sectors dealing with thickets, it reinforces the idea that Indian patent law isn't absolute; exclusivity is still subject to broader legal objectives.

Competition Law and Antitrust Concerns

Patent thickets start to raise competition-law concerns when the use or build-up of patents shifts from being a legitimate way to protect inventions to a way of distorting the market[39]. Owning patents isn't, in itself, a sign of abuse, and competition law needs to be careful not to mess with the fundamental reason patents exist in the first place. However, when these collections of patents are strategically used to block competitors, demand unfair licensing deals, or make things more expensive for rivals through overlapping claims and the threat of lawsuits, then it's fair for antitrust authorities to step in and take a closer look.

In India, the Competition Act of 2002 outlaws agreements that stifle competition and the abuse of a dominant market position. It also includes clauses that address what constitutes reasonable conditions for safeguarding intellectual property rights[40]. The tricky part is figuring out where to draw the line between a patent holder's legal right to exclude others and actions that take advantage of a thicket to skew competition beyond what the patent actually covers. This issue has become particularly noticeable in disputes involving standard-essential patents and commitments to fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory (FRAND) terms, where how licenses are handled can impact entire downstream markets[41].

Ongoing legal battles and regulatory debate in India surrounding the licensing of standard-essential patents highlight this point. While the legal boundaries between the Patents Act and the Competition Act are still being debated, discussions around recent Supreme Court cases suggest that the question of which body should handle allegations related to patented products is still a relevant and important one[42]. This debate is significant for patent thickets because a lot of the problems they cause don't just stem from the validity of the patents themselves, but from how the entire portfolio is managed, the leverage it provides in licensing, and the structure of the market.

Looking at competition law in other countries can offer some insights. Authorities in the US and EU have long acknowledged that patent pools, cross-licensing, and standard-setting can both boost efficiency and create risks of exclusion[43]. The worry isn't about patents themselves, but whether the way licenses are structured helps to lower transaction costs or unfairly strengthens the position of established players by making it harder for new companies to enter the market, shutting out outsiders, or driving up royalty costs. Indian competition analysis can learn from this practical approach, while still sticking to its own laws and focusing on its national development goals.

Case-Based and Comparative Analysis

Looking at experiences elsewhere helps us understand the dangers of patent thickets. Research in the US, focusing on software and semiconductors, has shown how these complex patent situations can slow down investment, make it harder for new companies to enter the market, and encourage companies to focus on strategic patenting instead of actual innovation[44]. At the same time, the US has also demonstrated possible solutions, such as more robust systems for reviewing patents after they've been granted, antitrust guidelines for patent pools, and ongoing discussions about regulating standard-essential patents (SEPs) and fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory (FRAND) licensing terms.

Similarly, European analysis highlights the difference between technological complexity and the potential for hold-up. Hall, Helmers, and von Graevenitz have shown that while opportunity and complexity can lead to more market entrants, the potential for hold-up has a distinctly negative impact by increasing the anticipated cost of getting involved[45]. This distinction is helpful for India because it stops us from assuming that all dense patent landscapes are inherently bad. Instead, the real worry is when these landscapes are combined with fragmented control and opportunistic licensing practices.

In India, the term 'patent thicket' isn't yet widely used in court decisions. However, the underlying problems are present in discussions about evergreening, SEP licensing, access to technology, and the appropriate relationship between patent law and competition law. The importance of the Novartis case lies not in its being a classic patent thicket case like those in the telecommunications industry, but in its demonstration of India's commitment to prioritizing patent quality and public interest as essential for granting exclusive rights[46]. Likewise, regulatory discussions about competition law overseeing patent-related behavior suggest that India is progressively addressing the structural problems that research on patent thickets highlights more clearly in other countries.

Balancing Innovation Incentives and Anti-Competitive Effects

A well-thought-out legal strategy needs to recognize that patents have two sides. They can foster innovation by giving companies a chance to recoup their research and development costs, reveal their inventions, bring in investors, and share technology[47]. In quite a few industries, particularly those that demand significant upfront investments, solid patent portfolios can also make collaboration, cross-licensing, and the creation of standards easier. So, just because there are a lot of patents in a specific area doesn't automatically mean something is wrong.

The problem arises when having a dense portfolio stops being a reward for innovation and instead becomes a private way to regulate and control who can enter the market. If companies aggressively patent things to gain an edge in negotiations, stockpile weak claims, or drive up the costs for competitors to introduce products, the motivation to innovate starts to clash with what's best for competition and consumers[48]. The anti-competitive effects then become difficult to spot because the barrier isn't a clear legal restriction; it arises from the way private rights are structured around a particular technology.

This delicate balance is particularly crucial for India. India is aiming to boost its domestic technological capabilities, encourage the creation of startups, and expand its digital infrastructure, all while ensuring consumers have access and markets remain competitive. If patent layering is accepted too broadly, it could put smaller domestic companies – the very ones that policies are designed to support – at a disadvantage. On the other hand, if genuine inventions aren't adequately protected, it could weaken the incentive to invest in cutting-edge research. Therefore, the law needs to be carefully calibrated rather than taking an all-or-nothing approach.

Regulatory and Policy Responses

There are several ways to lessen the negative impacts of patent thickets without getting rid of the incentives that patents provide. First off, keeping a close eye on patent quality is super important. By having stricter reviews, clearer guidelines on what's new and how things work, and really looking closely at how broad the claims are, we can cut down on those weak or confusing patents that just clutter things up without actually adding anything new or useful[49]. India's careful way of doing things in certain areas, like dealing with evergreening and inventions related to computers, gives us a solid foundation to build on.

Secondly, how we manage licensing matters. Patent pools and group licensing can make things cheaper and easier when different rights go well together. But, we need to keep an eye on these things to make sure they're open, fair, and don't lead to any sneaky collaborations. In industries that rely on standards, making sure everyone follows FRAND rules and using clear ways to figure out royalties can stop people from demanding too much or piling up royalties[50]. So, Indian regulators and courts should not only check if patents exist, but also think about how licensing deals affect competition further down the line.

Thirdly, competition law should still be an option for those rare cases where someone's using a patent portfolio to shut others out. If big companies use their patents to block new players, make unfair licensing deals, or make things too expensive for their rivals in ways that go beyond just protecting their inventions, then competition law should step in. But, we need to be careful and base our decisions on solid evidence, keeping in mind the technical details. We don't want antitrust measures to become an easy way to weaken patents that are actually valid.

Fourthly, it's essential that different agencies work together. Patent offices, competition authorities, and regulators often see different sides of the same issue. By talking more and working together, we can improve how we examine patents, oversee licensing, and settle disputes. This is especially important in areas like telecommunications and digital infrastructure, where standards and the ability to work with other systems really shape how competitive things are.

Conclusion

Patent thickets don't just ban competition outright; they're more like hidden obstacles that make it too expensive and risky for many companies to even try entering the market. In areas like software and semiconductors, where technology is super complex, we've seen that these tangled webs of patents can slow down funding, discourage new businesses, and lead to companies grabbing patents just to protect themselves. Plus, things like hold-up tactics and piling up royalties can make it even harder for newcomers to break in.

For India, the best way to handle this isn't by blindly supporting super strong patent protection or by dismissing the idea of exclusivity altogether. Instead, we need a balanced approach. Indian patent law already has ways to limit thickets by being stricter about what gets a patent and by protecting the public interest. And competition law can step in when companies abuse licensing or use their patent collections to unfairly control the market. So, the most reasonable stance is that patent thickets aren't automatically illegal, but if they turn patent rights into roadblocks that prevent further competition and innovation, then Indian law is right to get involved.

1. Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard Setting, in 1 Innovation Policy and the Economy 119 (Adam B. Jaffe et al. eds., 2001), https://www.nber.org/chapters/c10778.

2. U.K. Intellectual Property Office, A Study of Patent Thickets 7–10 (2013), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5a7dc04ded915d2acb6edea7/ipresearch-thickets.pdf.

3. Bronwyn H. Hall, Christian Helmers & Georg von Graevenitz, Technology Entry in the Presence of Patent Thickets 1–4 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 21455, 2015), https://www.nber.org/papers/w21455.

4. Competition Act, No. 12 of 2003, §§ 3–4 (India); Cyril Amarchand Mangaldas, Patents Act, 1970 or Competition Act, 2002: SC to Decide Applicability on Actions Against Patent Holders (Mar. 26, 2024), https://corporate.cyrilamarchandblogs.com/2024/03/patents-act-1970-or-competition-act-2002-sc-to-decide-applicability-on-actions-against-patent-holders/.

5. Shapiro, supra note 1, at 119–20, https://www.nber.org/chapters/c10778.

6. Shapiro, supra note 1, https://www.nber.org/chapters/c10778; U.K. Intellectual Property Office, supra note 2, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5a7dc04ded915d2acb6edea7/ipresearch-thickets.pdf.

7. Iain M. Cockburn & Megan MacGarvie, Patents, Thickets, and the Financing of Early-Stage Firms: Evidence from the Software Industry 4–7 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 13644, 2007), https://www.nber.org/papers/w13644.

8. Shapiro, supra note 1, https://www.nber.org/chapters/c10778; Rosemarie H. Ziedonis, Don't Fence Me In: Fragmented Markets for Technology and the Patent Acquisition Strategies of Firms, 50 Mgmt. Sci. 804 (2004), https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1040.0208.

9. Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 Tex. L. Rev. 1991 (2007), https://escholarship.org/uc/item/8638s257.

10. U.K. Intellectual Property Office, supra note 2, at 7–10, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5a7dc04ded915d2acb6edea7/ipresearch-thickets.pdf.

11. Id. at 25–31, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5a7dc04ded915d2acb6edea7/ipresearch-thickets.pdf.

12. Cockburn & MacGarvie, supra note 7, at 5, https://www.nber.org/papers/w13644.

13. Ziedonis, supra note 8, at 804, https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1040.0208.

14. Id., https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1040.0208.

15. Hall et al., supra note 3, at 8–10, https://www.nber.org/papers/w21455.

16. Herbert Hovenkamp, Mark D. Janis & Mark A. Lemley, IP and Antitrust: An Analysis of Antitrust Principles Applied to Intellectual Property Law ¶ 35 (2024 update).

17. Hall et al., supra note 3, at 1–3, https://www.nber.org/papers/w21455.

18. Id. at 8–10, https://www.nber.org/papers/w21455.

19. Cockburn & MacGarvie, supra note 7, at 12–13, https://www.nber.org/papers/w13644.

20. Id. at 4–7, https://www.nber.org/papers/w13644.

21. James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, Patent Failure: How Judges, Bureaucrats, and Lawyers Put Innovators at Risk 46–52 (2008), https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400828692.

22. Bhaven N. Sampat & Heidi L. Williams, How Do Patents Affect Follow-On Innovation? Evidence from the Human Genome, 109 Am. Econ. Rev. 203 (2019), https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20151398.

23. Shapiro, supra note 1, https://www.nber.org/chapters/c10778.

24. U.K. Intellectual Property Office, supra note 2, at 25–31, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5a7dc04ded915d2acb6edea7/ipresearch-thickets.pdf.

25. Jorge L. Contreras, A New Framework for Standard-Essential Patents 3–7 (2022) (as cited in the manuscript).

26. Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 9, https://escholarship.org/uc/item/8638s257.

27. Hall et al., supra note 3, at 8–10, https://www.nber.org/papers/w21455.

28. Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 9, https://escholarship.org/uc/item/8638s257.

29. Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 9, https://escholarship.org/uc/item/8638s257.

30. Josh Lerner & Jean Tirole, Efficient Patent Pools, 94 Am. Econ. Rev. 691 (2004), https://doi.org/10.1257/0002828041464683.

31. Steven C. Carlson, Patent Pools and the Antitrust Dilemma, 16 Yale J. on Regul. 359 (1999); Richard J. Gilbert, Antitrust for Patent Pools: A Century of Policy Evolution, 2004 Stan. Tech. L. Rev. 3.

32. Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 9, https://escholarship.org/uc/item/8638s257.

33. Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 9, https://escholarship.org/uc/item/8638s257.

34. Cockburn & MacGarvie, supra note 7, at 1–7, https://www.nber.org/papers/w13644.

35. Id. at 4–7, https://www.nber.org/papers/w13644.

36. Ziedonis, supra note 8, at 804, https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1040.0208.

37. Novartis AG v. Union of India, (2013) 6 S.C.C. 1 (India), https://indiankanoon.org/doc/165776436/; Patents Act, No. 39 of 1970, § 3(d) (India), https://www.indiacode.nic.in/handle/123456789/1392.

38. Patents Act, No. 39 of 1970, §§ 3(d), 3(k), 84 (India), https://www.indiacode.nic.in/handle/123456789/1392.

39. Patents Act, No. 39 of 1970, § 3(d) (India), https://www.indiacode.nic.in/handle/123456789/1392.

40. Novartis AG v. Union of India, (2013) 6 S.C.C. 1 (India), https://indiankanoon.org/doc/165776436/.

41. Patents Act, No. 39 of 1970, § 3(k) (India), https://www.indiacode.nic.in/handle/123456789/1392; Off. of the Controller Gen. of Pats., Designs & Trade Marks, Guidelines for Examination of Computer Related Inventions (2025), https://ipindia.gov.in/frontend/pdf/patents/guidelines/GUIDELINES%20FOR%20EXAMINATION%20OF%20COMPUTER%20RELATED%20INVENTIONS%20%28CRIs%29%20-%202025.pdf.

42. Patents Act, No. 39 of 1970, § 84 (India), https://www.indiacode.nic.in/handle/123456789/1392.

43. Competition Act, No. 12 of 2003, §§ 3–4 (India), https://www.indiacode.nic.in/handle/123456789/2010; U.S. Dep't of Just. & Fed. Trade Comm'n, Antitrust Enforcement and Intellectual Property Rights: Promoting Innovation and Competition (2007), https://www.ftc.gov/reports/antitrust-enforcement-intellectual-property-rights-promoting-innovation-competition-report.

44. Competition Act, No. 12 of 2003, §§ 3(5), 4 (India), https://www.indiacode.nic.in/handle/123456789/2010.

45. FRAND in India: The Delhi High Court's Emerging Jurisprudence on Royalties for Standard-Essential Patents, 10 J. Intell. Prop. L. & Prac. 609 (2015), https://academic.oup.com/jiplp/article/10/8/609/2457468.

46. Cyril Amarchand Mangaldas, supra note 4, https://corporate.cyrilamarchandblogs.com/2024/03/patents-act-1970-or-competition-act-2002-sc-to-decide-applicability-on-actions-against-patent-holders/.

47. U.S. Dep't of Just. & Fed. Trade Comm'n, Antitrust Enforcement and Intellectual Property Rights: Promoting Innovation and Competition (2007), https://www.ftc.gov/reports/antitrust-enforcement-intellectual-property-rights-promoting-innovation-competition-report.

48. Cockburn & MacGarvie, supra note 7, https://www.nber.org/papers/w13644; Ziedonis, supra note 8, https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1040.0208.

49. Hall et al., supra note 3, at 8–10, https://www.nber.org/papers/w21455.

50. Novartis AG v. Union of India, (2013) 6 S.C.C. 1 (India), https://indiankanoon.org/doc/165776436/.

Suggested Citation:

Rachita Nangalia, Patent Thickets in Technology Industries: Hidden Barriers to Market Entry and Innovation, NIDAN IPR Research Series 2026 (NIDAN Ctr. for Legal & Pol'y Rsch., Oct. 16, 2026).